Does the stock market consider lobbying expenditures to be a value-enhancing investment for firms? Is there truth to the popular view that lobbying adds value by facilitating corruption? In 2006, top lobbyist Jack Abramoff pleaded guilty to the bribery of government officials, which generated intense scrutiny of corruption in the lobbying process. Using this event as an exogenous negative shock to the ability of firms to lobby and engage in corruption, we examine the effect of lobbying on firm value. We find that a firm that spends $100,000 more on lobbying experiences an average decrease of $1.4 million in value in a 3-day event window around the guilty plea. Using corporate social responsibility rankings as a proxy for a firm's propensity to engage in corruption, we find that in response to the guilty plea, firms with a reputation for poor business ethics, experience a greater decrease in value due to their lobbying activities. Lastly, providing another indication that the market values corrupt lobbying practices, we show that anti-corruption legislation passed in the aftermath of the scandal significantly reduces the value of lobbying firms. Our results suggest that lobbying creates value for shareholders of lobbying firms, and that part of this value may be attributed to corruption.
I. Introduction
The academic literature models the lobbying process as one of information transmission, where interest groups communicate their specialized knowledge of particular issues to uninformed or overburdened policy makers (see Grossman and Helpman, 2001 , for a survey). 1 However, the lobbying process is not viewed favorably in the public sphere, 2 with the popular view being that lobbyists use unethical and even illegal means to influence politicians, at the expense of the public interest.
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Although corporations and special interest groups spend billions of dollars annually to lobby
Congress and federal agencies (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012) , there is an absence of robust evidence on the returns to lobbying. One empirical issue is that the decision to lobby may be endogenous to firm characteristics. For example, if higher valued firms are more likely to lobby it would be difficult to identify the causal impact of lobbying on firm value. Our identification strategy is to use an event that affects the ability of firms to lobby, but is exogenous to firm characteristics. Regarding corruption, it is also challenging to identify whether the market values corruption since data on corrupt spending are typically not available. An advantage of our event is that it also affects the ability of firms to engage in corrupt lobbying practices.
In this paper we examine whether the stock market considers lobbying expenditures to be a value-enhancing investment for the firms undertaking them, and whether corrupt lobbying practices create value for shareholders.
1 Policy makers may discount the information of interest groups if the groups have a reason to be biased and the information is unverifiable. By sending a signal through lobbying, even biased experts may credibly communicate with policy makers (Crawford and Sobel (1982) , Austen-Smith (1993 , 1994 , and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010)). show that firms that spend more on lobbying experience a significantly greater decrease in value compared to firms that spend less, or do not lobby. To illustrate, compared to a firm in the first decile of lobbying expenditures (average expenditures of $66,557), a firm in the tenth decile (average expenditures of $20.6 million), experiences a significant decrease in abnormal returns of 0.6% around the Abramoff event.
Described as the "biggest public corruption scandal in a generation," ("Case bringing new scrutiny to a system and a profession," The Washington Post, January 4, 2006), the guilty plea generated intense public and media scrutiny of the lobbying process, making it damaging for politicians to be associated with lobbyists. From a news report, "…Senators, congressmen, and their aides, now are insisting on paying for their own meals," ("In D.C., Abramoff scandal cools free lunches," NBC News, January 26, 2006). As a condition of the plea, Mr. Abramoff provided evidence that led to the convictions of several government officials. By generating intense public scrutiny of the lobbying industry, the Abramoff event raised expectations that lobbying and corrupt lobbying practices will face more restrictions, while being exogenous to individual firms' characteristics and prior lobbying decisions. 4 Although the practices of Jack Abramoff's lobbying firm came under scrutiny in 2004, the 2006 guilty plea was a major event because Mr. Abramoff provided evidence against several government officials as a condition of this plea, which triggered special investigations, led to legislation targeting corruption in lobbying, and focused public attention on the influence of lobbyists. We describe the extent of media coverage in Section II and show that the news coverage of Jack Abramoff and lobbying peaked in the immediate aftermath of the guilty plea.
Considering the sample of firms with positive lobbying expenditures, we again find that firms that spend more on lobbying experience a greater decrease in value. For example, a one standard deviation increase in average lobbying expenditures prior to the event year ($6.77 million), is associated with an average decrease in abnormal returns of 0.38%, or about $57 million, in a 3-day window around the event. These results are robust to firm-specific controls and industry fixed-effects.
Mr. Abramoff's guilty plea adversely affected the ability of firms to lobby by drawing attention to policy makers' interactions with lobbyists. The significant decrease in firm value associated with lobbying expenditures in response to the plea is therefore consistent with the view that lobbying creates value for the shareholders of these firms. The plea also affected firms' ability to engage in corruption by focusing attention on corrupt policy makers. Information provided by Mr. Abramoff as a condition of the plea implicated more than twenty lawmakers and officials, including Representative Bob Ney (R-OH) who was incarcerated for taking bribes, and the House Majority Leader, Representative Tom Delay (R-TX). The public pressure following the scandal spurred legislative efforts on Capitol Hill to address corruption in the lobbying process. Hence, the market response to this event is likely to also reflect the value of corrupt lobbying activities, which faced intense scrutiny in the aftermath of the guilty plea and subsequent federal investigations.
We undertake three additional tests to investigate whether the market values corrupt lobbying.
First, we examine whether the loss in market value associated with lobbying is more pronounced for firms that may be a priori more likely to engage in corruption. To capture propensity to engage in corruption, we hypothesize that a firm's reputation for socially responsible business practices is likely to be correlated with its willingness to engage in corruption. The corruption watchdog group Transparency International notes that anti-corruption and corporate social responsibility (CSR) are based on similar principles of transparency and accountability, and companies that engage in corruption are unlikely to attain their CSR goals (Transparency International, 2010) . Porter and Kramer (2006) also argue that the two are linked, and suggest that safeguards against corruption should be part of firms' CSR goals.
The results show that in the 3-day event window around the guilty plea, the loss in value associated with lobbying expenditures is significantly greater for companies with a worse ethical reputation. Firms that are more likely to engage in corruption, benefit more from lobbying, which suggests that corrupt lobbying adds value.
Second, we examine the market response to the first lobbying-related law passed by the U.S.
Congress after the Abramoff guilty plea. The "Lobbying Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006" targeted corruption in lobbying by increasing disclosure and penalties, and curbing quid pro quo arrangements. We find that firms that spend more on lobbying experience a significant decrease in market value in response to the introduction of this bill in the U.S. Senate. For the sample of firms that lobby, a one standard deviation increase in lobbying expenses ($6.77 million) is associated with an average decrease in market value of nearly $41 million in the 3-day window around the introduction of the bill. Since firms engaged in legitimate lobbying are less likely to be affected by these restrictions, this result provides additional support for the view that lobbying adds value by facilitating corruption.
While the response of firms to the Abramoff event suggests that the market values corruption in lobbying, lobbying may also facilitate the legitimate communication of information to policy makers. To examine the informative role of lobbying, we hypothesize that firms characterized by greater information asymmetry and opaqueness may derive more value from lobbying activities. However, using different measures of information asymmetry at the firm level, we do not find that more opaque firms benefit more from lobbying.
We conduct several checks to verify the robustness of our results. First, we establish that the results capture the Abramoff guilty plea rather than other confounding events. Based on the fact that the Abramoff scandal mostly implicated Republicans, we investigate whether firms connected to the Republican Party are differently affected. 6 The Washington Post reported that "Republicans worry…that Abramoff, known for his close ties to (former Republican Speaker of the House), DeLay, mostly implicates Republicans as a result of his plea agreement."
Using data on the political connections of corporate board members, we find that in response to the guilty plea, firms connected to the Republican Party experience lower announcement returns compared to firms connected to the Democratic party and unconnected firms. We also note that the impact of lobbying on firm value remains statistically significant after controlling for political connections, which suggests that lobbying is not a proxy for the partisan preferences of firms.
Our results do not appear to be driven by confounding events such as calendar year effects.
Examining the market reaction around January 3 rd in the two years prior and the year after the event year of 2006, we do not find a significant association between lobbying expenditures and market reactions.
Lastly, we show that our results are robust to controlling for alternative measures of firm size, industry competition, and the presence of regulated industries.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use an exogenous shock to identify the value of lobbying, and to provide evidence suggesting that corrupt lobbying practices generate shareholder value. In two related studies, Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010) find that firms that lobby experience better financial and accounting performance relative to non-lobbying firms; and, Hill, Kelly, and Van Ness (2011) find that the annual excess returns of lobbying firms are higher than those of nonlobbying firms. Our paper differs from these studies in the following ways: First, our event study approach mitigates some of the identification issues that arise regarding endogeneity of the lobbying decision by examining the market reaction to an event that affects the ability to lobby, but is uncorrelated with firm characteristics. Second, we also focus on the value of corruption in lobbying.
Another related literature examines the impact of campaign contributions on firm value. Rocholl, and So (2009, 2011) ). These studies consider the role of political connections, while we focus on the value of lobbying.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the events, Section III describes our data, Section IV presents the results, and Section V concludes.
II. Events
Our initial analysis focuses on the guilty plea by top lobbyist Jack Abramoff on January 3, 2006
to criminal felony counts related to the corruption of public officials and defrauding of American Indian tribes. As a condition of the plea, Mr. Abramoff provided evidence that led to the convictions of more than twenty elected representatives, Congressional staff, and executive branch officials. The scandal notably ended the career of prominent House Majority Leader Tom Delay (R-TX), and led to the incarceration of Representative Bob Ney (R-OH) for taking bribes.
While the investigation of Jack Abramoff began in 2004, his guilty plea generated widespread media coverage of what had been, until then, mainly a Washington D.C. scandal. In Figure I we describe the number of news articles returned from a Factiva search for all days between January 2004 and December 2006, using key-words such as "Abramoff", "lobbying", and "regulation". The graph shows a sharp increase in news coverage in the immediate aftermath of the guilty plea. Based on the heightened public scrutiny of politicians' relationships with lobbyists, we argue that the plea increased expectations that lobbying and corrupt lobbying practices would face restrictions in the future.
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In the aftermath of the plea, the U.S. Congress debated a number of bills intended to regulate corruption in lobbying.
Since this shock is exogenous to individual firms' characteristics and their prior lobbying decisions, it mitigates many of the identification issues that arise regarding the endogeneity of the lobbying decision.
9 sponsored by Senator Trent Lott (R-MS). 10 It was the first bill on lobbying to come out of committee after the Abramoff guilty plea, and also the first to be voted on in both the U.S. House and Senate. There were no other lobbying related laws passed in the months surrounding this event.
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Bill S.2349 focused on increasing disclosure and curbing corruption in the lobbying process. Henceforth, we refer to firms that report $10,000 and more in lobbying expenditures as lobbying firms, and those that spend less than $10,000 as non-lobbying firms. Table I Using stock market data from CRSP, we construct the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns experienced by each firm around the relevant events. In Table I , CAR (-1,+1) is computed as the marketadjusted cumulative abnormal return in a 3-day window centered at the January 3 rd , 2006 date of Mr.
Abramoff's guilty plea. Returns are adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted index. Throughout the paper we tabulate and report results for the 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. To verify the robustness of our findings, we also use market-model adjusted returns and 7-day window (-3,+3) returns. The results are similar, albeit less statistically significant for the longer event window.
In Figure II we plot median cumulative abnormal returns for lobbying and non-lobbying firms on each day of the 10-day window around January 3, 2006. Specifically, for each firm we sum up daily abnormal returns starting from day -5 until day +5. The figure suggests that the CARs of lobbying firms are more negative than the CARs of non-lobbying firms, starting from the event date.
We construct two measures of lobbying activity. The first, Lobbying Rank, groups firms into deciles based on their three-year average lobbying expenditures prior to 2006. Companies with the highest lobbying expenses are assigned a rank of 10 (average lobbying expenditures of $20.6 million), and companies with the lowest lobbying expenses are assigned a rank of 1 (average lobbying expenditures of $66,557). Firms that do not lobby are assigned a rank of 0. From Table I we note that the average value of Lobbying Rank for the full sample is 3.7. Appendix IV provides the cutoff points for the deciles based on lobbying expenditures.
The second measure we use is Lobbying Expenses, defined as the sum of lobbying expenditures for each firm in the three years preceding the Abramoff guilty plea, and constructed for the sample of 421 firms that lobby. In unreported estimates we verify that our findings are robust to using lobbying expenditures from the year 2005 only, immediately preceding the event year. From Table I Panel B we note that on average firms that lobby spent nearly $4 million during this period. The biggest spender is
General Electric Company, with $56 million in lobbying expenditures. Consistent with the minimum filing requirement, the smallest reported lobbying expense is $10,000.
To capture a firm's likelihood of being corrupt, we use corporate social responsibility (CSR) rankings published by KLD Research & Analytics, which evaluates the CSR practices of large U.S.
firms along several dimensions of strengths and concerns. Using data from 2005, we rank the CSR practices of 608 firms in our sample. Each company is evaluated along seven categories, Community
Relations, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Human Rights, Employee Relations, Products, and Environment, and assigned a point if it meets the criteria for a particular strength or concern. We focus on the concerns data to create our measure, Concerns Score, which is the aggregate number of concerns across all categories for each firm. To identify firms with relatively more concerns, we construct indicator variables for firms with concerns above the sample median, Above Median Concerns, and above the 75 th percentile of concerns Above P75 Concerns. From Table I we note that on average, firms in our sample have slightly more than 3 points of concern, with lobbying firms scoring higher than firms that do not lobby, where a higher score indicates a worse reputation. In our sample Exxon Mobil has the highest number of concerns, and also ranks among the top spenders with a Lobbying Rank of 10. In contrast, J.M. Smucker and Symantec are among the companies with the best CSR reputation and a
Lobbying Rank of 0 and 5, respectively. The correlation between lobbying rank and the concerns score is 0.48 for the sample of lobbying firms.
Our second measure of a firm's ethical reputation is Newsweek magazine's Green Score, which ranks firms based on their environmental impact and policies. Newsweek started publishing the Green Score in 2009, and assuming that these rankings do not change much in the short-run, we use the 2009 data. This score is available for 390 firms in our sample. The Green Score is a weighted sum of three measures: Environmental Impact (45%), Green Policies (45%), and Reputation (10%). The
Environmental Impact score is from Trucost, which specializes in environmental performance measurement, the Green Policies score is from KLD, and the Reputation score is based on a survey of CSR professionals, academics and experts by CorporateRegister.com.
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We use three proxy measures of information asymmetry at the firm level to examine if firms that are more opaque benefit more from lobbying. First, based on the argument that firms with more intangible assets are likely to be characterized by greater opaqueness, we use Almeida and Campello's (2007) measure of tangible assets. Tangibility Score is computed as (.715×Receivables + .547×Inventory
+ .535×Capital + Cash) scaled by the book value of total assets, where a higher value implies more tangible assets, or less information asymmetry. Second, we use the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets, which may capture more knowledge intensive firms, and a higher value of this variable indicates more information asymmetry. Lastly, we measure accounting transparency using an earnings
From From Table I we note that firms that lobby are larger with an average market capitalization of $25.3 billion, compared to $7.68 billion for firms that do not lobby. We control for firm size in the regression analysis. Since lobbying is likely to depend on the competitive structure of industries, we also construct the industry Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI), which measures industry concentration based on the Fama and French 12 industry classifications. The average value of HHI is 2.31 for the sample of lobbying firms and 2.09 for the sample of non-lobbying firms (Table I) . Lastly, we define Regulated Industry as a dummy variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a regulated industry such as public utilities, railroad, banking, finance, or insurance. Table I shows that on average 22% of lobbying firms are in a regulated industry, compared to 18% of non-lobbying firms.
14 Cash flow from operations is calculated as operating income minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as: ( ∆Total Current Assets -∆Cash) -(∆Total Current Liabilities -∆Short-term Debt -∆Taxes Payable) -Depreciation Expense.
IV. Results

A. Does lobbying add value?
We examine the stock price response of our sample firms to the guilty plea by Jack Abramoff on January 3 rd 2006, to charges of corruption and bribery of public officials. Since this event exogenously affected the ability of firms to lobby and engage in corruption, the market's response should indicate whether investors view lobbying as a value enhancing investment. To investigate, we estimate the following specification:
where Considering the subset of firms that lobby in columns (4) and (5), the results suggest that companies that spend more on lobbying experience a larger decrease in abnormal returns around Abramoff's plea. To illustrate, from the coefficient of Log(Lobbying Expenses) in column (4) we estimate that firms that spend $100,000 more on lobbying experience an average decrease in value of $1.4 million around the event.
The negative market response to an event that increased the probability of future restrictions on lobbying suggests that the market views lobbying as a value-enhancing investment.
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Below we further investigate the corruption channel in three ways: First, we examine whether firms that are more likely to be corrupt benefit more from lobbying; Second, we examine the market reaction of firms to the passage of the first anti-corruption in lobbying law passed after the Abramoff guilty plea; Third, we investigate the informational role of lobbying.
Since the guilty plea focused attention on corruption in lobbying, increasing the likelihood of restrictions on corrupt arrangements between lobbyists and policy makers, the results are also likely to capture the market value of corrupt lobbying.
B. Do less ethical firms benefit more from lobbying?
To investigate the market value of corrupt lobbying, we examine whether firms that may be more likely to engage in corrupt activities benefit more from lobbying. Based on the argument that firms with a reputation for unethical business practices are more willing to engage in the corruption of public officials, we investigate whether such firms benefit more from lobbying. The results based on a firm's environmental reputation are reported in column (4) of Table III .
The interaction between Lobbying Rank and Above Median Green suggests that among firms of average lobbying rank, the negative impact of increased lobbying restrictions is attenuated by 0.14% for firms with an environment friendly reputation.
Lastly, we note that the coefficient of Lobbying Rank is not statistically significant in columns
(1)-(3). This coefficient captures firms with either no ethical concerns (column (1)), or firms with a better ethical reputation (columns (2) and (3)), which suggests that lobbying does not significantly benefit firms that are less likely to engage in corruption. The negative coefficient of Lobbying Rank in column (4) suggests that firms with poor environmental practices are more likely to be negatively affected by restrictions on lobbying and corruption.
C. Do laws restricting corruption affect value?
Next, to further investigate the corruption channel, we examine the market reaction to the first anti-corruption in lobbying law passed following Jack Abramoff's guilty plea. The "Legislative 16 Estimating this specification for the sample of lobbying firms we find that the interaction terms have the correct sign but are not statistically significant. 17 While the concerns measures enter with a positive sign, we note that these coefficients capture the market impact for just 31 and 14 firms in columns (2) and (3) Since it attempted to reduce corruption, a negative stock price reaction to this bill among lobbying firms would suggest that the market values corruption in lobbying, and indicate that the bill may have a real economic impact.
We examine the cumulative abnormal returns for the firms in our sample in a 3-day event window surrounding each of the dates noted above. The results reported in Table IV We also examine the announcement returns around the passage of the bill in the U.S. House of Representatives in columns (5) and (6) of Table IV , and find similar results that are less statistically significant. Since the House vote occurred almost three months after the introduction of the bill in the Senate, the result suggests that the market may have already incorporated its expectations of the passage of the bill by the time of the vote in the House. the 3-day event window around the Senate vote). The market reaction to the passage of this bill may also reflect expectations that unlike previous attempts, the enforcement of these anti-lobbying restrictions will be binding given the magnitude of the fallout from the Abramoff event. The market may have also anticipated other restrictions on corrupt practices would follow, which is supported by the fact that six more lobbying related bills were introduced in subsequent years.
Taken together, the finding that less ethical firms benefit more from lobbying, and the negative market response to the anti-corruption bill, suggest that corruption in lobbying adds value.
D. Do opaque firms benefit more from lobbying?
Lastly, we investigate whether lobbying adds value by facilitating legitimate communication between firms and politicians. Although recent research argues that lobbyists are valued for their connections rather than for their issue-based knowledge (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011), Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and, Fons-Rosen (2011)), theory suggests that lobbying allows experts to communicate specialized information to overburdened policy makers (Grossman and Helpman, 2001 ).
To investigate this information channel, we examine if more opaque firms that are characterized by greater information asymmetry benefit more from lobbying.
We use three measures of opaqueness at the firm level: Almeida and Campello's (2007) measure of asset intangibility; the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; and an earnings management measure based on Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). In Table V While we do not find robust evidence in support of the informational role of lobbying, it may be the case that the Abramoff event is viewed by the market as one that should affect firms that engage in corrupt lobbying, and not firms that undertake legitimate lobbying.
V. Robustness Checks
In this section we investigate the robustness of our results to alternative interpretations and specifications. First, we use data on the political connections of firms to establish that our results capture the effect of the Abramoff guilty plea, rather than confounding events. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, since Jack Abramoff was Republican, Republican Party members faced greater scrutiny compared to their Democratic Party counterparts following the scandal. Therefore, if firms connected to the Republican Party are more affected by the guilty plea this would help to establish that we capture the impact of the plea rather than other events.
Using data on the political connections of corporate boards, we examine the market response for firms on January 3, 2006. From the results reported in column (1) of Table VI , we note that firms connected through their corporate boards to the Republican Party experience significantly negative abnormal returns compared to firms that are only connected to the Democratic Party, and firms without connections. This result suggests that we measure the effect of Mr. Abramoff's guilty plea rather than other confounding events. The results are similar using another measure of political connections, the Connection Indicator, which takes the value of 1 for Republican Party connections, a value of -1 for Democratic Party connections, and a value of zero for all other firms. The results confirm that political connections to the Republican Party result in a more negative stock return relative to firms connected to the Democratic Party and unconnected firms. We obtain similar results in columns (3) and (4) for the subset of lobbying firms. Lastly, we note that the coefficients of the lobbing variables remain negative and significant after controlling for the political connections of firms, suggesting that lobbying is not a proxy for partisan affiliations and/or political preferences.
We also examine whether our results might be driven by other confounding events, such as a calendar time effect given the proximity of the plea date to the New Year's Day holiday on January 1 st .
In Table VII , we examine whether there is a market reaction on the same event date in the two years prior and the year after our event year, and do not find a significant association between the lobbying activity of a firm and its market value during this event window in other years.
Since the decision to lobby and its impact are likely to be affected by the competitive structure of the industry, we examine the robustness of our results to industry competition and regulation. To control for the competitive structure of industries, we estimate the main specifications from Table II controlling for the Herfindahl index using the Fama and French 12 industry classification. The results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table VIII suggest that lobbying expenditures are not a proxy for industry concentration, since the estimated coefficients of the lobbying variables retain their sign and statistical significance after controlling for industry concentration. In columns (3) and (4) of Table VIII we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in a regulated industry (public utilities, railroad, banking, finance, or insurance). The results confirm that lobbying firms experience a decrease in value in response to the Abramoff event after controlling for the presence of regulated industries, which suggests that lobbying does not only benefit firms in these industries.
Firm size is likely to be an important determinant of the decision to lobby and its impact on firm value. As an alternative robustness check for size we control for the relative importance of lobbying expenditures as a share of total expenditures at the firm level. The lobbying variables retain their sign and statistical significance as reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table VIII . Lastly, we estimate the main specifications in Table II after clustering the standard errors at the industry level. The results are similar and we do not report these to save space.
VI. Conclusion
Despite the fact that corporations and interest groups spent about $30 billion lobbying policy makers over the last decade, there is a lack of robust empirical evidence on whether firms' expenditures on lobbying add value for the shareholders of these firms. Moreover, while the public perception is that lobbying involves corrupt practices, this has been difficult to show since corruption data are typically not directly observable.
Our main contribution is to identify an event that exogenously affects the ability of firms to lobby and engage in corrupt practices. Using the guilty plea by top Washington D.C. lobbyist Jack
Abramoff to bribery and corruption as an exogenous negative shock to the ability of firms to lobby and engage in corrupt lobbying acts, we find that firms that lobby more experience a significant decrease in market value in response to this event. The market reaction suggests that lobbying adds value to firms, and part of this value may arise from corruption.
Based on the argument that firms that rank poorly in business ethics may be more likely to engage in corruption, we show that the loss of value associated with lobbying is greater among firms with a poor ethical reputation. Examining the market reaction to the first law targeting corruption in lobbying to be passed by the U.S. Congress after the Abramoff event, we find that firms that lobby more experience a more negative market response to the legislative restriction of corrupt practices. Our results suggest that market participants view corrupt arrangements between lobbyists and policy makers as value-enhancing.
(Sec. 107) Subjects registered lobbyists, employees, and clients to civil penalties of up to $50,000 for offering gifts to a covered legislative branch official of the House in knowing violation of House rules. Title VI: Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits -(Sec. 601) Amends federal civil service law regarding the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) to exclude from retirement accounting any service as a Member of Congress of an individual finally convicted of a felony involving bribery of public officials and witnesses, conspiracy to commit an offense or to defraud the United States, or acting as an agent of a foreign principal. Entitles such individual, all the same, to so much of his or her lump-sum credit as is attributable to such service.
Title VII: Leadership PACS -(Sec. 701) Amends FECA to permit a leadership political action committee (PAC) to use its funds for: (1) otherwise authorized expenditures in connection with campaigns for election for federal office; (2) tax deductible charitable contributions; and (3) transfers to a national, state, or local committee of a political party (subject to applicable FECA limitations). Defines leadership PAC as a political committee directly or indirectly established, maintained, or controlled by a candidate for federal office or an individual holding federal office, but which is not an authorized committee of the candidate or individual. Excludes from the meaning of leadership PAC, however, any political committee of a political party.
Title VIII: Ethics Training for Lobbyists -(Sec. 801) Requires the Committee, during each Congress, to provide an eight-hour ethics training course to registered lobbyists. Subjects registered lobbyists who fail to complete such course at least once during each Congress to LDA penalties to the same extent as for LDA noncompliance.
Title IX: Miscellaneous Provisions -(Sec. 901) Amends the federal criminal code subjecting individuals to fines and penalties for bribery of public officials and witnesses to include as an "official act" (which might be influenced in violation of such law) any decision or action on an earmark. (Thus subjects such organizations to the requirements of the Act. A 527 organization, as defined by section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, is an organization, not controlled by or involving a particular candidate for office, whose function is to influence or attempt to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any federal, state, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the election of presidential or vice-presidential electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected, or appointed.) Requires the organization to give notice to the Secretary of the Treasury under section 527 that it is to be treated as an organization described in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. Except from the definition of 527 organization under FECA a committee, club, association, or other group of persons (organization) which: (1) is a 527 organization under the Internal Revenue Code; (2) is organized, operated, and makes disbursements exclusively for paying certain tax-deductible business expenses or expenses of a certain kind of political newsletter fund; (3) consists solely of candidates for or individuals holding state or local office, but only if the organization refers only to one or more nonfederal candidates or applicable state or local issues in all of its voter drive activities, without reference to any federal candidate; or (4) whose election or nomination activities relate exclusively to elections where no candidate for federal office appears on the ballot, or to influencing the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of one or more candidates to nonfederal offices or individuals to non-elected offices, or influencing one or more applicable state or local issues. Denies the treatment of any such organization as meeting such exclusivity requirement if it makes disbursements aggregating more than $1,000 for: (1) a public communication that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a clearly identified candidate for federal office during the one year period ending on the date of the general election for the office sought by the candidate (or if a runoff election is held with respect to such general election, on the date of the runoff election); and (2) any voter drive activity during a calendar year, except a drive in only one state with no reference to federal office candidates.
(Sec. 1003) Sets forth rules for allocation and funding for certain expenses relating to federal and nonfederal activities, including payments of 100% or 50% from a federal account in several specified circumstances. Limits individual donations to a political committee that is a separate segregated fund or non connected committee to an annual aggregate of $25,000 for its qualified nonfederal account.
(Sec. 1004) Repeals the limit on the amount of party expenditures on behalf of candidates in general elections. Raises the limits for House and Senate candidates facing wealthy opponents.
(Sec. 1006) Prescribes special rules for actions brought for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the constitutionality of any provision of this Act. Requires such an action to be filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and to be heard by a three-judge panel. Makes any final decision by the panel reviewable only by the U.S. Supreme Court. Authorizes Members of Congress to: (1) bring an action challenging the constitutionality of this Act; and (2) intervene in any action in which the constitutionality of any provision of this Act is raised. Applies such special rules only to actions brought on or before December 31, 2008.
Appendix III Variable Description CAR(-1;+1) in %
The cumulative abnormal return of each firm calculated over a 3-day window centered at the respective event date. The abnormal returns are in percentage. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted using the CRSP value-weighted index.
Lobbying Expenses
A continuous variable that measures the amount of money (in $'s) spent on lobbying by a firm in the 3-year period 2003-2005 (included 
Regulated Industry
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in a regulated industry and 0 otherwise. Regulated industries are industries with the following 2-digit SIC codes: 40, 48, 49, 60, 61, and 63 .
Figure I
The figure shows the number of articles returned from a Factiva key-word search over the period January 2004-December 2006. The search imposes the following conditions: 1) at least two mentions of "Abramoff" and "lobb*" and one of the following terms: "accus*", "fraud*", "investig*", "regula*", "reform*" "restric*", "scand*", "strict*", "unlaw*", and 2) the article contains at least 1000 words. This figure shows the median cumulative abnormal returns for the lobbying and non-lobbying firms on each day during a 10-day event window (-5,+5) centered at the date of Abramoff's guilty plea (January 3, 2006) . The cumulative abnormal return of a firm on each day during the event window is the sum of the daily abnormal returns experienced by this firm between this day and day -5. (1) and (2) show estimation results for the Introduction. Columns (3) and (4) show results for the Senate Vote.
Columns (5) and (6) show results for the House Vote. Columns (1), (3) and (5) use the full sample of firms, while the rest of the columns use the sub-sample of firms with positive lobbying expenditures. All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table reports results from cross-sectional regressions that estimate the value-relevance of corporate lobbying for opaque firms, using the event date of Jack Abramoff's guilty plea (January 3, 2006) . Column (1) uses asset tangibility based on Almeida and Campello (2007) . Column (2) uses R&D/Total Assets; and column (3) captures earnings management. Panel A uses the full sample of firms, while Panel B uses the sub-sample of firms with positive lobbying expenditures. All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All Firms
(1) (January 3, 2006) . Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample of firms, while columns (3) and (4) use the sub-sample of firms with positive lobbying expenditures. All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (5) and (6)). Columns (1), (3) and (5) use the full sample of firms, while columns (2), (4) and (6) use the sub-sample of firms with positive lobbying expenditures. All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (1) and (2) and regulated industries in columns (3) and (4). The firm's lobbying expenditures as a fraction of its total expenses are used in columns (5) and (6). Columns (1), (3), and (5) use the entire sample of firms, while columns (2), (4), and (6) use the sub-sample of firms with positive lobbying expenditures. All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) 
